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Online censorship: ban on reporting parallel exchange rates

vendredi 15 novembre 2013 à 17:51

The National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) issued a censorship order on 9 November for websites reporting parallel exchange rates. Administrative proceedings have also been initiated against Internet Service Providers allowing access to these websites. CONATEL chief Pedro Maldonado said 50 websites were concerned by the measure.

In a 9 November televised address, President Nicolas Maduro announced that “through the Ministry of Science and Technology, we are protecting our country’s network and Internet, and we are taking the following websites off line: dolartoday.com, tucavidi.com, lechugaverde.biz, dolarparalelo.org and preciodolar.info…” These websites can no longer be accessed from within Venezuela, however they remain accessible from abroad.

In line with this rhetoric, the government refers to media reports about the parallel dollar rate and the current shortages as a “conspiracy” or a “plot” requiring appropriate reprisals. “The parallel dollar is a fictitious dollar, a fake dollar, created to foster the ongoing economic war,”the President said.

This major act of censorship comes amid a grave economic crisis. The Venezuelan government sets a fixed exchange rate for the US dollar that has differed from the international market rate since 2003. The difference between the official rate and the parallel rate (the real rate) is now enormous.

To justify the measure, the authorities are claiming that publishing parallel dollar exchange rates violates article 27 of the Radio, TV and Electronic Media Social Responsibility Law RESORTEMEC.

This article includes a ban on the dissemination of reports liable to “spread panic within the population or disturb public order.” It also holds Internet Service Providers responsible for the content on the websites they host.

CONATEL added that the law on illicit exchange rates bans currency transfers at rates different from the officially established ones. The NGO Espacio Público has pointed out the law does not prohibit mentioning the unofficial dollar rate, which is furthermore of public interest. While it is true that websites are reporting black-market dollar exchange rates, the publication of such information is not illegal, and the Venezuelan government is clearly applying censorship measures.

Bellow is a screenshot of the exchange rate published by one of the censored websites.

http://www.lechugaverde.biz/

"Since the closure of all brokerage firms in Venezuela by the Bolivarian government in 2010, all foreign currency selling outlets outlets, and even information about foreign currency, have been banned. Persons or businesses using the unoficial exchange rate be punished with seven years in prison or more.

Venezuela is ranked 117th out of 179 countries in the latest Reporters Without Borders press freedom index.

Using TrueCrypt to protect your data

mardi 29 octobre 2013 à 15:54
Online Survival Kit

TrueCrypt is a software application that allows you to encrypt a single file, an entire partition on a hard disk or a storage device such as a USB flash drive. Encrypting data makes information inaccessible to an unauthorized third party. If your computer (or your USB flash drive) is lost or stolen, no one can access the encrypted data without knowing the password you set.

The principle

This tutorial explains how to create a TrueCrypt volume (or container) that encrypts all the files contained within it. This container or volume can be on a hard disk, a USB flash drive, a memory card and so on.

To understand how it works, it helps to compare a TrueCrypt volume or container to a safe. Each time you want to encrypt a file, you open the TrueCrypt volume, move the file into the volume, and then close the volume. The file is then encrypted and protected.

Before starting

Before starting, download and install TrueCrypt on your computer. TrueCrypt is free, open-source software available for Windows, Mac and Linux. As a TrueCrypt volume is protected by a password, you must now:

  • Create a strong password: a sequence of letters and numbers of your choosing (not a quote or a line from a film), a random password. Something long and complicated that cannot be found in a dictionary.
  • Remember your password. If you forget it, you will not be able to recover the data in your TrueCrypt volume.
  • Don’t write your password down anywhere. The best password is useless if someone can find it… stuck to your keyboard, for example.

Create the volume

To create an encrypted volume, launch the TrueCrypt application and click on the Create Volume button.

 

You are presented with a choice between three options. The first is to create an encrypted file container, the second is to create an encrypted non-system partition and the third is to encrypt a system partition. Select the first option, Create an encrypted file container, and click on Next.

 

Now you can choose between creating a standard encrypted volume and a hidden encrypted volume (we will explain that later). Click on the first option, Standard TrueCrypt volume, and then click on Next.

 

You must now choose the location where you want to create your encrypted volume. It can be located in a folder on your computer’s hard disk, in an external storage device (such as a USB flash drive, an external disk drive or NAS device) or in an online storage device. Click on Select File to choose a location.

 

In the file selector window that opens, choose a location, give a file name to the volume you are going to create (you may, if you want, give it an explicit name such as “My Photos.tc” or “Encrypted Data.tc”). And then click on Save.

 

The file name and full path you have chosen are displayed in the Volume Location field. Click on Next.

 

In the next window, choose AES, the default encryption algorithm.
After selecting the desired encryption algorithm, there is a second choice, the hash algorithm. The hash transforms your password into irreversible code. If you don’t know which to choose, select SHA-512 (also used by US governmental organizations). After making your choice, click on Next.

 

Specify the size of the volume you want to create. The sizes are expressed in KB, MB and GB, the abbreviations of kilobyte, megabyte and gigabyte (1 GB = 1,000 MB = 1,000,000 KB). If you are not sure how space you need, here are some average file sizes:

  • A Word file: 200 KB
  • A photo (taken with a camera): 1 MB
  • A sound file (MP3): 4 MB
  • A film (encoded in DivX): 700 MB.

Nowadays, the hard drive capacity of the average laptop ranges from 160 GB to 320 GB, while USB flash drives range from 2 GB to 16 GB in size. After specifying the size of your volume, click on Next.

 

You must now set the password that you will use to encrypt and decrypt your data. You are advised to choose one with at least 20 characters. You can choose a phrase that will be easier for you to remember, or you can use a random sequence of characters (which is harder to crack). If you opt for  a phrase, it shoud not be a known one (such as a quote, a line from a film or a song title).

 

TrueCrypt does not let you use accented letters (such as é à ï ô or ù) in a password. If you want a phrase with accented letters as your password, use the non-accented equivalents. You can use symbols and punctuation marks to make the password more difficult. After choosing your password, click on Next.

 

Optional: This window will only appear if you have chosen to create a volume of more than 4,096 MB (4 GB) in size. The FAT32 file system limits the size to 4,096 MB. For anything bigger, choose Microsoft’s NTFS format. If you have limited understanding of computers, select No. Then click on Next.

 

The TrueCrypt container is now going to be created. If you don’t know what the options in this screen refer to, keep the defaults. We advise experienced users against checking the Dynamic option. It allows the TrueCrypt volume to increase in size dynamically (according to storage needs) but poses a security problem inasmuch as it lets any attacker know the real size of the stored data and poses a problem for plausible deniability of a hidden volume. Your are now going to format the volume. The programme fills the container’s unused space with random data. Click on Format to start the formatting.

 

This can take a long time, depending on the size of the volume, the speed of the processor and the performance characteristics of the medium in which it is being created.

 

Congratulations. You have just created your encrypted volume. To finish, click on Exit.

 

Opening the encrypted volume

To access your data, click on Select file.

 

Select the encrypted volume where it has been saved and then click on Open.

 

You an also access the encrypted volume by double-clicking on it in File Explorer.

 

Your encrypted volume’s filename and path appears in the Volume field. From the list of virtual drive letters, select the drive letter that you will use to access your encrypted data (usually the first one will do). Click on the Mount button.

 

Enter the password you set when you created the TrueCrypt volume and then click on OK.

 

The encrypted volume is now “mounted” as a standard drive that is accessible from within File Explorer. You can now access the content of your encrypted volume directly from within File Explorer by double-clicking on the drive with the letter you chose, or by clicking on the drive and selecting Open.

 

Using the encrypted volume

We are going to encrypt a file on our hard disk: a photo. It is currently in the Pictures folder. After selecting it, we “cut” it so that it will no longer be available in unencrypted form in its original position.

 

Once we are located in the mounted TrueCrypt volume, we “paste” it. It is now safely in our encrypted volume. Our image and all the files that we henceforth move to this volume will automatically be encrypted. The password that was set when the volume was created will be necessary to access them.

 

Once the files have been moved to the digital safe (the mounted TrueCrypt volume), it must be closed again by means of an operation called “dismounting.” (It is automatically closed if the computer is turned off.) To do this, select the volume in the list and then click on the Dismount button. You can also just click on the Dismount all button.

 

TrueCrypt and plausible deniability

TrueCrypt offers the possibility of creating a hidden volume for the eventuality that you are forced to surrender your password. It is the principle of the bag with a double bottom or, in cryptography, plausible deniability.

Instead of creating a single encrypted volume, you can use TrueCrypt to create two, an outer volume and a hidden second volume within it. Each volume opens with different passwords. The outer one is just a decoy. The really confidential data is inside the inner volume. Even if you reveal the password to the outer volume, it will not provide access to the inner volume, whose existence cannot be detected. It is impossible to know if space encrypted by TrueCrypt contains one or two volumes.

To create a hidden volume, start as you would for creating a regular volume:

Click on the Create Volume button

 

Select Create an encrypted file container and then click on Next.

 

You now have the choice between creating a Standard TrueCrypt volume and a Hidden TrueCrypt volume. Click on the latter and then click on Next.

 

The procedure is much the same as the one described earlier, except that you create two volumes, first the external one and then the hidden inner one, each with different passwords.

There are several drawbacks to using a hidden volume:

  • It results in a loss of storage space
  • You have to remember an additional password
  • If you created the hidden volume some time ago and have not touched the partition since then, your adversary may, if he knows what he is looking for, be alerted to its existence by the date that a file was last modified.

There are other ways to conceal data. It is possible, for example, to conceal a TrueCrypt container within video files. This is less easy to execute but offers better camouflage.

Original article published here: http://wiki.korben.info/truecrypt (in french).

Wave of dismissals after Gezi Park protests

mardi 13 août 2013 à 18:05

The conservative Turkish daily Sabah fired well-known journalist Yavuz Baydar as its ombudsman on 23 July after refusing to print his last two commentaries. So Baydar, who held the position for many years, joined the long list of leading journalists to have been dismissed or forced to resign from prominent Turkish media. The liberal daily Milliyet fired its editor, Derya Sazak, five days later and then its well-known columnist, Can Dündar, two days after that.

WeFightCensorship is posting the first of the two commentaries by Baydar that Sabah censored. Entitled “Dangers of swimming in turbulent waters,” it criticizes the way some Turkish media demonized the international media for their coverage of the “Occupy Gezi” protests. It urges them to halt the attacks and calls for solidarity among journalists.

The commentary was sent to Sabah’s editors on 24 June but, instead of publishing it, Sabah editor-in-chief Erdal Safak ran a scathing editorial about Baydar, who was very upset. He took several days off and wrote an op-ed piece blaming media owners for the self-censorship now widespread in Turkey. The New York Times published it on 19 July. When he went back to work at Sabah, he offered another commentary on relations between the ombudsman and the editor-in-chief. It too was never published.

Gezi Park highlights self-censorship

The demonstrations that began being held in Istanbul’s Gezi Park in late May to defend the park from the threat of demolition quickly grew into a national protest movement against the Erdogan government’s authoritarian tendencies. The protests were unprecedented in their scale and ability to transcend Turkish society’s deep rifts, and the authorities responded by criminalizing them and using force to disperse them.

Sometimes attacked by demonstrators, reporters were also the victims of systematic violence and arrests by the police. Outspoken journalists and social network users were branded as the Trojan horses of an international conspiracy to bring down the government.

The Turkish Union of Journalists (TGS) said that at least 22 journalists were fired during the protests and 37 were driven to resign. Some journalists reported that their editors had censored articles.

The Islamist daily Yeni Safak, for example, refused to publish an article by Isin Eliçin, entitled “External forces and Mehmet Ali Alabora,” in which she criticized the campaign of intimidation and disinformation that her newspaper had been waging since 10 June against Alabora, an actor who had expressed support for the demonstrators on Twitter. He was threatened after Yeni Safak portrayed him as one of the leaders of a “conspiracy designed to bring down the government.”

Six journalists resigned together from +1, a new privately-owned TV station, on 11 July, accusing the owner of interfering in its editorial policies.

Although exacerbated by the polarization resulting from the Gezi Park protests, this tendency is not new. There has been an increase in high-profile dismissals and resignations of leading journalists in recent years. The daily Aksam’s staff were “reined in” after a change of ownership in June 2013. Milliyet columnist Hasan Cemal was forced to resign in March over a controversial article on the Kurdish issue. Ahmet Altan had to resign from Taraf in December 2012. Aysenur Arslan was fired from CNN Türk, Andrew Finkel from Today’s Zaman, Banu Güven from NTV, Ece Temelkuran from Haber Türk and Mehmet Altan from Star. Some little-known journalists have meanwhile enjoyed meteoric promotions.

Although politicized, the Turkish media have the merit of being very diverse. But that may not last much longer. There are no safeguards that prevent media owners from meddling in the editorial independence of their staff. The vulnerability of their staff is increased by the fact that most newspapers are nowadays owned by big holdings that are active in such sectors as construction, finance and telecommunications ­– sectors in which winning state contracts is crucial.

As a result, it has become harder and harder over the years for Turkish business journalists to do in-depth investigative reporting. And to protect their business interests in the most profitable sectors, some media owners exercise all their influence to tone down their media’s criticism of the government.

The scale of the growing self-censorship trend was seen when many leading Turkish media ignored the Gezi Park protests for the first few days. The fact that CNN Türk broadcast a wildlife programme at the height of the clashes in Taksim Square on 31 May drew so much comment that the photo of a penguin quickly came to symbolize media connivance with the government. Another 24-hour news channel, NTV, had to apologize to its viewers for failing in its duty to report the news.

The contrast between the initial silence from leading Turkish media and the live coverage that the protests received from leading international TV broadcasters resulted in a big surge in the latter’s viewer ratings in Turkey. But it also elicited fierce hostility from government officials and pro-government media, which accused the international media of “disproportionate” and “biased” coverage.

Anti-foreign media hysteria

In speech after speech, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan portrayed the demonstrators as “vandals” and “fringe elements” acting at the behest of terrorist organizations and international speculators. He also targeted CNN, the BBC and Reuters. “You have been fabricating false information for days,” he said at a meeting on 16 July. “But you stand alone with your lies. This is not the nation whose image you have projected to the world.”

Some of the Turkish media quickly followed the prime minister’s lead, accusing the international media of deliberately orchestrating a campaign of disinformation against Turkey with the aim of besmirching its image or even bringing the government down. The climate of mistrust was extreme and worse was to follow.

The daily newspaper Takvim ran a fake interview with well-known CNN anchor Christiane Amanpour on its front-page on 18 June. Headlined “Dirty confession,” the bogus interview had Amanpour confess that CNN had slanted its coverage of Turkey’s protests “for money” and “under pressure from international lobbies.”
 
Ten days later, Takvim went so far as to file a complaint against CNN and Amanpour, accusing them of denigrating state institutions and using their coverage of the protests and “false news” to stir up hatred within the population. At the same time, a hostile campaign launched by Ankara’s mayor on Twitter against BBC correspondent Selin Girit set media and social networks ablaze and Girit found herself accused of being a British spy.

Zambia: offensive against independent news websites

jeudi 1 août 2013 à 10:49

During the 2011 presidential election campaign, Patriotic Front leader Michael Sata, the opposition challenger, promised to rid the Zambian media of government interference if elected. It was an attractive promise in a country with just three national dailies and little tradition of media pluralism. Nonetheless, the situation has not improved since Sata’s September 2011 election victory. On the contrary, the Zambian authorities are currently waging a witchhunt against journalists and dealing a series of blows to independent news reporting.

Website blocking and arrests

The old saying that “promises only mean something to those who believe them” has been well and truly confirmed in Zambia during the past two months. In June and July, the authorities blocked two news websites and arrested three journalists presumed to have been working for them or providing them with information.

On 24 June, the government blocked access to Zambian Watchdog, an independent news website that is based abroad and is critical of the current government. Its technicians reacted immediately by moving the site to a new domain name (http://zwd.cums.in) and Reporters Without Borders created a mirror of the site. Despite these measures, Zambian Watchdog is still inaccessible from within Zambia.

The authorities also arrested three of Zambian Watchdog’s presumed contributors: Thomas Zyambo, Clayson Hamasaka and Wilson Pondamali.

  • Hamasaka is charged with possessing obscene material.
  • Zyambo was freed provisionally after 48 hours in detention. He is facing up to seven years in prison on charges of sedition and “possession of seditious material with intent to publish.”
  • Pondamali is facing a possible two-year jail term on a charge of “unlawful possession of a restricted military pamphlet.”

It was the turn of another independent news website, Zambia Reports, to disappear from the Zambian Internet on 16 July. Its staff received no explanation for this latest act of censorship. The blocking of the site was all the more surprising because in March 2012 the site agreed to a request from a member of the government to remove an article despite being under no legal obligation to do so.

Rampant surveillance

This recent wave of arrests and website censorship is the culmination of a new policy of intrusive surveillance in Zambia.

In September 2012, the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Agency (ZICTA) announced that it was implementing a requirement under the 2009 Information and Communication Technologies Act for all mobile phone users to register with their operators.

Each client now had to provide their name, the numbers of their national registration card and driver’s license (for Zambian subscribers), or passport and work permit number (for non-Zambian subscribers), their postal address, their email address and their SIM serial number.

The agency said the sole aim was to combat criminality but Zambian Watchdog insisted that “the secret service also known as Office of the President (OP)” was collecting all the data in order to identify government opponents.

The new surveillance measures are not limited to mobile phones. The NGO Global Voices reported in February that the Zambian government was working with Chinese specialists to install a system of Internet surveillance and control. It quoted an anonymous Zambian Watchdog source as saying:

They have already started their work (…) They have been visiting service providers so as to understand the topology of the network. For those who may not know, [this means] appreciating the network architecture, things like where the servers are so that they know [where] to install their interception devices.

The blocking of Zambia Reports and Zambian Watchdog is clear evidence that the new control devices are now in place. One of the security experts in charge of Zambian Watchdog’s website hosting said it was obvious from the way the Zambian authorities responded to the attempts to bypass the blocking that they were using filtering methods based on Deep Packet Inspection:

After twelve hours we could confirm that malicious traffic was not generated by the readers but was actively injected into the network when a reader was requesting content from the website www.zambianwatchdog.com and that this behaviour could only be explained by the presence of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment inside Zambia.

Blurring the lines between government and media

The surveillance measures have been accompanied by pressure on the mainstream media. Shortly after Sata was installed as president, a dozen journalists with The Post Newspaper, one of the national dailies, were offered government jobs and the pay to go with it. One of The Post’s journalists told Zambia Reports:

We are living in fear because we don’t know whether to continue debriefing our bosses who in return report us to our government sources. What we’ve now resorted to is self-censorship; we kill these stories the moment we realize they implicate government officials.

Posts

We are posting two Zambia Reports articles that were published a year apart (available as PDF files). The first is the most recent one. Entitled “Zambia Requested to Stop Blocking Access to Websites” and published on 25 July 2013, it is an open letter to the information ministry from Zambia Reports in response to the blocking of its website.

It asks the ministry to explain the blocking. It calls for a National Assembly enquiry into online censorship. And it calls for the unblocking of Zambia Reports and all the other the other blocked sites. It also mentions Zambia’s use of Chinese help with installing an Internet surveillance system.

We are posting it here so that the Zambian authorities can read it (because Zambia Reports is still blocked within Zambia) and so that they can resolve what is perhaps no more than a misunderstanding.

The second article, entitled “Patriotic Front Heads Toward Confrontation with Online Media” and published on 25 July 2012, describes the decline in freedom of information in Zambia. Correctly foreseeing what lay ahead, the author concluded:

Despite a very low Internet penetration rate of just ten per cent, there are many people who fear that the government is determined to silence these Internet publications, depriving opponents of the ruling party of a voice to communicate their positions.

Courts censor Bettencourt recordings

lundi 15 juillet 2013 à 16:46

After finding them guilty of invading privacy, a Versailles appeal court ordered Mediapart and Le Point to purge their websites of all the recordings (and transcripts of the recordings) made by billionaire heiress Liliane Bettencourt’s butler in her home without her knowledge in 2009 and 2010. If Mediapart had not complied by midnight on 22 July, the deadline set by the court, it would have had to pay a fine of 10,000 euros a day. Nonetheless, this content, which exposed conflicts of interest and abusive requests for donations from Bettencourt, a major shareholder in the French cosmetics company L’Oreal, was of public interest. The importance of the suppressed content – more than 100 written, audio and video files – sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of information. News websites and human rights organizations including WeFightCensorship have decided to post this content online because they believe that, as the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have established, a legitimate right to privacy should not automatically prevail over a legitimate right to information.

An “affaire d’état”

The “Bettencourt affair” began to make the headlines in 2007, when Liliane Bettencourt’s daughter set about trying to get Bettencourt declared a ward of court on the grounds those around her were exploiting her mental and physical frailty for personal gain. But what started out as a family affair quickly became an “affaire d’état.”

Recordings secretly made in her living room in 2009 and 2010 exposed dubious tax manoeuvres and links with politicians and judicial officials. What with secret funding of a political party, tax evasion, influence peddling, abuse of a person’s frailty, fraud and misuse of assets, the “Bettencourt affair” became a leading news story from the summer of 2010 onwards.

The judicial case was transferred to Bordeaux, where it resulted in more than ten formal investigations, including an investigation into former President Nicolas Sarkozy on suspicion of exploiting Bettencourt’s frailty for personal gain.

Affair within the affair – the recordings

Mediapart and Le Point published extracts from the secret recordings on 16 June 2010. The man responsible for them was the billionaire heiress’ butler, Pascal Bonnefoy, who wanted to provide evidence that advantage was being taken of his employer, then aged 86.

He handed the recordings over to Liliane Bettencourt’s daughter, Françoise, who in turn gave them to the Fraud Squad, which had been investigating suspected abuse of Bettencourt’s frailty since 2007.

Mediapart learned of their existence a few days later and, on the grounds that they contained information of public interest, decided to publish extracts that excluded “all allusions to personal privacy and intimacy.” Of more than 20 hours of recordings, Mediapart and Le Point published only one hour.

Court censorship and disproportionate sanctions

The removal of the recordings from the Mediapart and Le Point websites is the result a court’s opinion on the relative importance of privacy and the right to information of public interest. In its 4 July decision, the Versailles appeal court argued that revealing information of public interest can never justify an invasion of privacy.

The requirement to inform the public in a democratic society, specified in article 10 of the aforementioned convention [European Convention on Human Rights], which could have been satisfied by investigative and analytic reporting carried out under the right to confidentiality of sources, cannot be justified by the dissemination of recordings or even extracts of recordings that were obtained by violating the right to privacy as affirmed by article 8 of the same convention.”

This ruling violates media freedom and does not accord with the judicial precedents established by the European Court of Human rights. The ruling in Fressoz and Roire v. France established that revealing information of public interest can justify a violation of privacy, contrary to the Versailles appeal court’s ruling.

The Versailles appeal court ordered Mediapart and Le Point to remove all the extracts of the recordings, even those that constituted evidence in other cases and allowed the public to learn of scandals involving leading politicians such as then budget minister Eric Woerth and former President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The Versailles appeal court’s decision also contradicts other European case law such as Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. The Netherlands (§43 and §44), on the absence of any requirement to prevent the publication of information that has already been widely disseminated, and Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (§38) on the journalist’s right to produce evidence of his claims.

The ruling in Público - Comunicação Social, S.A. and others v. Portugal made it clear that draconian financial sanctions – such as 10,000 euros a day – tend to push journalists to censor themselves. The court ruled: “Such an award [of damages of 75,000 euros each against four persons] would inevitably be likely to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion of issues affecting the life of the community and was liable to hamper the media in performing their task as a purveyor of information and public watchdog.”

For all these reasons, WeFightCensorship is publishing the content censored by the French judicial system.

Download all the recordings and transcripts.

Listen to a selection of extracts:

  1. This passage from the Bettencourt recordings reveals the links that existed at the time between Nicolas Sarkozy’s legal adviser, the manager of Liliane Bettencourt’s fortune, Patrice de Maistre, and then Nanterre prosecutor Philippe Courroye. It concerns a judicial decision in the dispute between Bettencourt and her daughter. There are grounds for thinking that the Elysée Palace and De Maistre may have learned of this decision more than a month before it became public.

  2. Cheques for three leading politicians are being signed. Liliane Bettencourt is giving 7,500 euros each to Eric Woerth, Nicolas Sarkozy and Valérie Pécresse (who at the time was a candidate for Paris mayor).

  3. In this extract, De Maistre explains to his employer, Liliane Bettencourt, that he must go to Switzerland to close her bank accounts “before Christmas” because, on 1 January, the French government could obtain information from the Swiss authorities about the accounts of French taxpayers who are tax exiles. He is ready to transfer money from Bettencourt’s Swiss accounts to Singapore, another tax haven. As a result of the Mediapart and Le Point revelations, Bettencourt will have to pay the French government 100 million euros in readjusted back taxes.

The Versailles appeal court decision of 4 July 2013:

PDF : http://www.mediapart.fr/files/ArretVersailes-Bettencourt.pdf

Preceding court decisions

First decision: Paris high court

Liliane Bettencourt and her financial adviser, Patrice de Maistre, responded to the publication of the recordings by suing Mediapart and Le Point for violation of privacy on 22 June 2010. A Paris high court judge ruled on 1 July 2010 that the violation of privacy had to be defined by the content of the recordings and not just by the way they were obtained. Finding that the content was of legitimate public interest, the judge referred to article 11 of the Declaration of Human Rights and the Citizen and article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights expressing the need to reconcile freedom of expression and information with respect for privacy. He concluded that removing the recordings would constitute “an act of censorship contrary to the public interest.”

PDF : http://www.mediapart.fr/files/Ordonnance_Tribunal_de_Paris_0.pdf

Second decision: Paris appeal court

A few days later, on 23 July, a Paris appeal court upheld the high court judge’s decision, finding that the violation of privacy was minimal because the content published by Mediapart and Le Point concerned the management of Liliane Bettencourt’s assets and Patrice de Maistre’s professional activities. Mediapart had selected the content posted in order not to violate Bettencourt’s privacy.

PDF : http://www.mediapart.fr/files/Arret_Cour_dAppel_de_Paris_0.pdf

Third decision: Court of Cassation

The Court of Cassation quashed the appeal court’s decision on 6 October 2011 and transferred the case to the Versailles appeal court. The Court of Cassation found that recording private or confidential conversations without consent constituted a violation privacy that was not justified by the public right to information.

PDF : http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/898_6_21184.html